Terma Blog

What Does It Mean for Europe to Be “Ready for War by 2030”?

Written by Terma | Dec 17, 2025 6:30:00 AM

From talk to a roadmap

For years, European defense debates were filled with strategy papers, visions and “sense of urgency” speeches. But, as Séverin puts it, there was a missing piece: “We were talking a lot, but we did not have a clear plan.”.

That has changed. The European Commission has now presented the Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030. According to Séverin , this marks an important evolution:

“Now we have something to deliver on and something where the member states will be held accountable, where we have some metrics and where we will measure the progress.”

In other words, readiness is no longer just a political aspiration. It is tied to concrete actions, timelines and accountability.

Defining “ready” in an unstable environment

The timing of this roadmap is not accidental. Since the last time these guests were on the podcast, the security environment has degraded. Séverin pointed to a series of very tangible examples:

  • Airspace violations by jet fighters
  • Drone incursions across Europe
  • Brussels Airport having to close three times in one day because of drones
  • Increasing uncertainty about how the war in Ukraine will evolve

What used to be framed as a strategic trend has now become visible in day-to-day security decisions. As Séverin puts it: “Now I think the facts have become bigger than just the talks.”

This shifting reality changes what “ready by 2030” actually needs to mean. It is no longer enough to have long term plans if the threat picture is evolving

The tools on the table: Roadmap, EDIP and SAFE loan

Readiness is not only defined by documents. It is also defined by the instruments that turn political intent into practical progress.

Christine pointed out that the Danish EU presidency has been especially active on defense and security. During this period, the European Defense Industrial Programme (EDIP) was concluded, the Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030 was agreed, and a Defense Readiness Omnibus was introduced to cut red tape and make it easier for the European defense industry to integrate across borders.

She described the roadmap as “a very significant document. It is a plan which will hopefully implement some of those big strategic visions that have been floating around for some time now.”

Parallel to these developments, the SAFE loan has become another crucial instrument. When it was first proposed, there were open questions about whether member states would even be interested. Now that the dust has settled, the picture is clear. Christine explained that 19 out of 27 EU member states have applied for the loan, effectively making it fully ascribed. As Séverin added, while 150 billion euros may not sound like much once divided among 19 countries, it sends an important market signal and ties directly into the growing emphasis on European preference.

European preference and “what counts” as progress

One of the most important shifts that the roadmap ties into is how Europe defines the capabilities it wants to build. Séverin broke down what European preference means in practice:

  • Products are produced in the EU
  • By an EU controlled entity
  • With at least 65 percent EU components
  • With European design authority (IPR and the ability to modify systems without asking another country’s permission)

This is simply not just about labels, but rather about how Europe measures strategic autonomy and readiness. He pointed to very concrete national examples that mirror this trend:

  • Denmark selecting a European air defense system (a French Italian system called SAMP/T NG) over the US Patriot
  • Germany planning to spend more than 80 billion euros next year on contracts, with 90 percent of that money going to European systems and equipment

In other words, readiness is increasingly measured in both how much Europe spends, but also where the money goes and what kind of industrial base it builds.

Roadblocks: speed, coordination and trust

Ambition is one thing. Delivery is another. When the question of roadblocks came up, Séverin did not hesitate: “It is always a mix of the challenge of coordination and the challenge of speed. Speed is of essence.”

For industry, this urgency translates into a need to be involved much earlier in the process. Early engagement makes it possible to understand and match requirements, to plan production at scale, and to deliver systems on time rather than scrambling to meet shifting expectations later.

At the heart of this lies trust. Séverin illustrated the point with a concrete Terma example: a 30 year contract on Very Short Range Air Defense (VSHORAD) with the Danish Acquisition and Logistics Organization (DALO). Thirty years is an unusually long commitment, but that timeframe creates room for a phased and strategic partnership instead of short term, transactional projects that leave both sides vulnerable to uncertainty.

Christine expanded on this, emphasizing that the state industry relationship itself must be rethought:

“We are in a new time today where we need to completely rebuild the relationship between the state and the industry on a range of policy areas, but especially when it comes to defense.”

The shift is already visible. At the NATO industry forum in Bucharest, the Secretary General delivered a message that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago: “Everything you produce will be purchased. Do not be afraid of surplus. We will buy it.”

It was a clear signal that the relationship between governments and industry is changing. Europe is moving from hesitation to commitment, from fragmented demand to a genuine recognition that industrial capacity is now a strategic asset in itself.

Citizens, costs and legitimacy

The debate on defense spending may start in Brussels, but it ultimately raises fundamental questions about public legitimacy. Séverin shared a figure from Euractiv that brings this down to the individual level. On average, each EU citizen pays 2 euro and 90 cents per day for defense.

That raises questions:

  • Is that enough, given the security environment?
  • What happens when defense spending reaches, and potentially exceeds, 2 percent of GDP across member states?
  • Which budgets will be reduced to make room for higher defense spending: health, tax cuts, or something else?

Christine noted that for decades, post Cold War spending shifted in the other direction. Defense went down, health went up. That balance is now changing, and citizens will feel it.

Bringing people along for that journey is part of what it means to be “ready.” Without public support, long term commitments are hard to sustain.

Ready by 2030 or ready sooner?

The year 2030 has become a symbolic anchor for Europe’s defense ambitions, yet the timeline is already under pressure. Much of today’s planning and procurement has been built around the idea of being ready by 2030, but the rise of drone incursions and hybrid threats is pushing Europe to consider whether readiness needs to come earlier.

This shift affects how readiness is understood and what kinds of capabilities Europe should invest in. Stockpiling systems like drones may be a poor choice if the technology becomes outdated within a few years. Christine pointed instead to ideas such as subscription based access to fast evolving technologies, smaller groups of countries working together on shared capabilities, and more flexible ways of organising ownership and availability.

All of this underlines a larger point throughout the discussion: readiness must be reflected in real capability decisions that will still make sense five or ten years from now, even as the security environment keeps changing.

If you want to dive deeper into how Séverin and Christine see Europe’s path from strategy to implementation, and how instruments like EDIP, the SAFE loan and European preference are forming the defense landscape, listen to the full conversation in the Allies in Innovation podcast.