A drone buzzes low over a restricted zone. It’s too small to spot on radar, too fast to intercept in time. It’s not science fiction. It’s happening right now, at nuclear plants, power grids and government offices.
In this episode of Allies in Innovation, host Mikkel Svold talks with Karsten Marrup from the Royal Danish Defense College and Lasse Due Jørgensen from Terma, a global leader in drone defense tech.
They break down how drones are pushing past old security systems and what’s actually working to stop them. We get into real-world tactics, the limits of current tech and how AI fits into the picture. The future has arrived faster than expected, and it’s up to us to meet it head-on.
In this episode, you'll learn about:
01:55 Different types of drones and their purposes
06:18 Drones for critical infrastructure protection
08:00 Understanding motives behind drone activities
09:24 Challenges in detecting and countering drones
11:00 Radar limitations for small drones explained
13:53 Building a layered defense approach
17:27 Prioritizing critical infrastructure protection strategies
19:48 Mitigating threats from cheap drones
22:45 Importance of passive air defense measures
26:16 Exploring hybrid warfare and its implications
29:47 Cybersecurity and space operations questions to consider
34:15 Future of drone technology and defense strategies
This podcast is brought to you by Terma.
This podcast is produced by Montanus.
Mikkel Svold (00:12): Right now, I think most people working with safety and security in critical infrastructure, they are probably looking a little bit more to the sky than usual. Over the recent weeks, we've seen in the media, we've heard a lot of stories about drone activity over various kinds of sites. Some of them actual being drones, some of them maybe not, but at least the media coverage has been quite extensive. I think what we are trying to do today is to deep dive into what kinds of drones should a national security be prepared to counter and to mitigate. What kind of drones should critical infrastructure be able to anticipate? Of course, what can we do and why are drones so hard to detect and to do something about? You are listening to Allies In Innovation, a podcast by Terma. My name is Mikkel Svold and I'll be guiding you through this episode. With me in the virtual studio, I have two guests. I have, first of all, Karsten Marrup, who is the head of Air and Space Warfare Centre at the Royal Danish Defense College. Welcome to you.
Karsten Marrup (01:16): Thank you.
Mikkel Svold (01:17): I also have you, Lasse Due Jørgensen, with me. Are you with me as well?
Lasse Due Jørgensen (01:22): I am, absolutely.
Mikkel Svold (01:24): You are the global lead of drone detection and counter-UAS systems at Terma. I think I want to start out. In the light of all all the media coverage of drone activity that we've seen, I think it's a fair question to ask what kinds of drones are we talking about and are there different scenarios, different contexts that we should be aware of? I don't know. Karsten, would you mind starting out this question?
Karsten Marrup (01:55): Yeah, not at all. I'm happy that you asked this, because I would like to stress that a drone is not just a drone. A drone is a term that covers basically everything that moves without a human being on board. You can have drones in the sky, on ground, or on land. You got drones in the sea when you have subsurface drones. And of course what we're talking mostly about here is drones that are flying. They come in all sizes and shapes with all kinds of various purposes. As you just referred to, there's a lot of drone hype at the moment because of incursions in Poland and Romania, and also the talks that have been about drones on various sites in Denmark. These types of drones are all very different. Of course, I think it's very important for people to acknowledge or at least understand that drones are not just drones. They are extremely different in shape, size, and purpose depending on where they're being used and for what purpose.
Mikkel Svold (03:06): Can you try and explain what kinds of drones are we talking then?
Karsten Marrup (03:10): Yeah. Basically you can divide drones into purpose. Some drones are used for observation. We call that intelligence surveillance reconnaissance or RSR. Basically they're gathering information about what's going on either locally, near the front line with small drones, or on a longer distance with bigger drones or on a very long distance with the drones that are controlled by a satellite like the Global Hawk, for instance. That's one type of drones.
(03:42): There are also drones that are not meant to come back, then the drone actually becomes a weapon, a self-flying bomb more or less. They also come in different sizes. Again, if you look at the front line, we normally talk about first-person view drones or FPV drones. The term is a explanation of how the drone is controlled because the controller wears a pair of goggles and sees the world as the camera on the drone sees the world. And then basically the drone is dived into the target and detonates when in contact with the target.
(04:18): Small drones not very long range, normally up to 40 kilometers if they have a fiber-optical cable for control. There are some drones similar to those, but more professionally made. We call them loitering munitions. People may have heard about the Switchblade 600 and 300, American-produced loitering munitions donated to Ukraine. Same purpose as the FPV drones, but sometimes a slightly longer range and also a more capable warhead.
(04:50): And then you'll have the big drones like the Iranian-produced Shahed drones. Russia now produced them themselves under the name of Geran-2 and Geran-3, which is a jet-powered drone version of that. Those types of drones are basically cruise missiles, but they're still called drones, unfortunately, and that is a totally, totally different thing from the drones I just mentioned.
(05:16): When Russia employs these drones against the Ukraine, they employ them together with a similar type of drone called Gerbera, which is a drone that is made as a decoy. It will gather information and then relay that to Russia on its way. It has a very small warhead as well. Because now it's there, it might as well do some damage. But the main purpose is actually to be a decoy in order to stress the Ukrainian air defense. In between all of that, you'll then have, as I said, the ISR drones in various sizes.
Mikkel Svold (05:55): These are what you would call frontline drones. The context here is you are at war and you're at the frontline. What about the drones that are not meant for frontline, that are not meant to kamikaze down into something and then detonate? What about those? What are we talking about, say, for critical infrastructure protection?
Karsten Marrup (06:18): Well, that depends, because the Shahed drones or the Geran-2 and 3 are not frontline drones. They are long range precision strike air drones, but as long as you're talking about the critical infrastructure-
Mikkel Svold (06:28): But I mean, they're for active war?
Karsten Marrup (06:33): Definitely. If you're talking about critical infrastructure, well, there's two sides to that coin if you ask me. One thing is, again, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance. Basically, if those who want to do something not nice to us are trying to gather data, that will be an intelligence surveillance reconnaissance drone or ISR drone. Again, they would come in different sizes, which again also means that our ability to detect those drones would require different kinds of tools, because radars essentially see everything but normally only see what you ask them for. And then we top tune radars to surveil specific kinds of items. Again, if we have to protect critical infrastructure, well, we can protect that against data collection, but also we need to somehow be able to protect that against attack, and then we are back at the same type of drones that we just talked about.
Mikkel Svold (07:33): And last question here, I think, before we turn over to you, Lasse, the aim of any drone activity when we are not at war, when we are not talking Ukraine. But what is the purpose for the hostile parts, so to say, or the person sending the drone? What is the purpose typically that we should be aware of?
Karsten Marrup (08:00): Well, again, data collection is one thing. Basically if somebody is trying to conduct espionage on you, that's one thing. Another thing could be what we call a hybrid means, which basically means that you will employ in order to see what happens. How does the opponent react? Are you able to stress the opponent? Stuff like that. For instance, if drones are flying in an airport, you have to shut down the airport. That would be what we normally refer to as hybrid means for the opponent to make some sort of attack, but we would call it an hybrid attack. It's not a war. Employment of hybrid means it's under the threshold of what we would call war. That could be a purpose for launching drones over, for instance, an airport.
Mikkel Svold (08:56): I think the term hybrid war, I think, we should dive into just in a second. But before we do that, Lasse, why is it so hard to do anything about these drones, be they on the battlefield, frontline kinds of drones, or even critical infrastructure? And I'm guessing also the large drones, if we are talking radar, they would probably be easier to see. Am I right?
Lasse Due Jørgensen (09:24): You're absolutely correct. I'm super happy for this breakdown that Karsten made of the drones, because the first question I always ask whenever someone is approaching and asking about the counter-UAS systems is, "What exactly are you looking for? What is the operational context here that we're looking for?" Because it seems, and especially right now out in the public, there's just this thought that the drone is a drone and you can detect it with a counter-UAS system. But as Karsten just clearly showed, there's a very big difference between different types of drones and also the operational capability that these drones have and the characteristics of these drones. Often, they're just put into one bucket, saying it's drones, and we definitely shouldn't do that.
(10:06): You rightly said typically these long range ISR drones, they come at a certain size. At least from a radar perspective how we see them, they more resemble a small aircraft than actually what we would normally call a drone. In the other end of the spectrum, you have these FPV drones, quadcopter type drones that are very unlike aircrafts. Typically, it has been sold that, in air defense, you had long range air defense radars, you had medium range, and they were able to see these incoming aircrafts. But when you suddenly have something like a small quadcopter very nearby you, they are not tuned for that. As Karsten also said, you'll typically have a radar that is tuned for a specific purpose and we just haven't focused on this before. We need a different layered approach in order to mitigate all these new threats that we see from the drones.
Mikkel Svold (11:00): I think one thing that would be nice for the listener to know, without getting too much into the technical details, but still why can't your everyday radar... Why can't you spot a quadcopter drone on your radar screen? I mean, the media covers that we have several airports with activity over them. I mean, the airports themselves have radars all over them. Why can't you see those drones on the radar screens?
Lasse Due Jørgensen (11:32): In very simple terms, you can say that these radars are tuned for seeing aircrafts at a long range. You want early detection on something incoming, and that is what they're doing. They're typically looking at something moving fairly fast, long range, small out there. They are looking somewhat upwards, trying to avoid looking into ground because that gives a lot of background noise. But when you see these small drones, they are very small, so they can hide in background ground noise, they have the same size of other objects, could be birds. Birds are very big issues when you're trying to distinguish between drones and not drones. Also, they're typically flying fairly low ground [inaudible 00:12:15] in there. That poses a difficulty to these existing radars, where there is somewhat of a gap in the existing radars when you're talking of what we have normally deployed for air defense.
Mikkel Svold (12:29): Is it only a question of how to tune the software, what you actually see? In my mind, I'm tuning in on an FM radio station. Is it only about how to adjust the knob or is it also something about what hardware is actually in the antenna out there?
Lasse Due Jørgensen (12:51): It's very much on the hardware and that comes down to physics. Basically, if you want to have a lot of power out there, you want to see something at a long range, you use a lower frequency air band that gives you a lesser resolution. And if you have not very high resolution on your radar, it might be good for seeing something early, but seeing very small targets nearby in a high environment then becomes difficult. There, we want to move to a different type of radar where we have a higher resolution so we can distinguish between background noise and the drones, but that of course comes at the cost and of the long-range detection. These radars that we use specifically for drone detection, they have a much shorter range than what you would have in a defense radar. In radars, everything is a compromise. Radars are always... I mean, we adhere to physics, unfortunately, so it's always a compromise. We have to choose one or another. That's why I'm talking about this layered approach where we need multiple different systems in order to basically mitigate all these air threats that we're seeing.
Mikkel Svold (13:53): And then Karsten, let me turn to you again and then ask you what do we then need to rest assured that we have a powerful or even a sufficient protection layer of critical infrastructure against these kinds of incursions?
Karsten Marrup (14:16): Well, I would say, overall, you basically need various radars to detect an incoming threat. You need the ability to identify what the radars are picking up and, if needed, you need the ability to do something about it. Basically you need some kind of effector as well. Again, that varies very much whether the thing you see is a missile, a cruise missile, an aircraft, a medium-sized drone, a small-sized drone, because there is no one solution fits everything. It doesn't exist. As Lasse just pointed out, for instance, the radars, well, they will work in different frequency bands because some radars are good at spotting small things quite close. And of course, an early warning radar should be able to see bigger things quite far. That are two different kinds of radars.
(15:13): And then also, you need to put in some filters on your radar. It's basically if you go online and you're searching for a secondhand car or a used car... For instance, there's something in Denmark called Bilbasen or the Carbase and you can search, I don't know, let's just say there's 20,000 used cars on Bilbasen but you don't want to look at all of them. You might want to distinguish between what kind of fuel they run on, which brand they are, and so on and so forth, because the radar operator doesn't want to see everything. The radar operator don't want to see birds and clouds and a plastic bag flying in the wind if they're looking for aircraft, so they put in filters for that specific radar to look for that specific thing. Various radars for various types of objects and also various effectors for various type of objects. You don't want to shoot down a Russian Geran-2 drone with a billion-dollar or a million-dollar expensive air-to-air missile or, sorry, ground-to-air missile. You want an effector that is tailored for that specific purpose.
Mikkel Svold (16:25): I think we should definitely come back to that as well to how do we level the playing field a little bit more so we don't use effectors that are a thousand times more expensive than the actual threat. But what do you think in order to protect... Let's say if we look at only national defense or protecting national integrity in critical infrastructure, what do we then need? Because personally, I would say it's probably not possible to have a counter drone radar at every single piece of critical infrastructure in Denmark, because, I mean, that's all the way from military bases to airports and all the way down to a specific transformer station out on the field near where I live. But I mean, all of them are critical, but how do you cover them all? Is it possible?
Karsten Marrup (17:27): Well, first of all, if you need to protect yourself, you need to have situational awareness. You can't protect yourself from something you don't know is there. And then we're back to the detection part. We need specific tailored radars for specific tailored purposes. You're absolutely right, there's no way we can protect everything. Then, of course, we need to prioritize what kind of critical infrastructure, be that military or civilian. Is it that we prioritize at least first to protect with the capabilities that we have?
(18:05): As listeners might know, Denmark is investing heavily in ground-based air defense, which is very capable against aircraft and cruise missiles and, to some extent, short-range ballistic missiles. None of that is actually quite useful when it comes to cheap drones, small drones, and especially not if somebody would bring short-range FPV drones into Denmark. Those systems would be absolutely useless against that. Therefore we need, again, detectors to detect that kind of threat and effectors for that as well. There's no way we can protect everything and there's no way we can protect everything against an attack where the attacker chooses to fire a lot of incoming missiles and drones at once, as we see that the Russia is doing in Ukraine at the moment. Hard choices need to be made in order to figure out where do we place our critical assets at the most critical infrastructure.
Mikkel Svold (19:13): I think, Lasse, let me turn to you then and come back to this notion of leveling the playing field a little bit in terms of cheap weapons as in commercially available drones you can buy from Wish.com or whatever. Those are now being weaponized or even just used as reconnaissance means. How do you then level the playing field, like Karsten is alluding to, so we don't spend the expensive equipment on very cheap drones.
Lasse Due Jørgensen (19:48): Well, again, I think it's important to distinguish them between actual war scenario and then what we are talking about in terms of protecting national critical infrastructure. In the war scenario, as we see in Ukraine, the biggest issue right now is the adversary's ability to scale this spread. When you're looking at the number of drones that you can produce, then it becomes very difficult protecting against, because if you create a counter drone system or an air defense system that can handle whatever number of drones simultaneously, on the other side the adversary will just, the next time, send a wave with twice as many drones and so on. That scalability, we really have to somehow cut the curve in terms of the cost of our defensive systems, the effective parts if we are to mitigate that.
(20:40): I think that's very much what everyone in this sector is talking about right now. How do we find an effector where we can actually mitigate this large number of incoming potential air drones? That is very difficult and we haven't fully come to that yet. I mean, there's a lot going on in terms of using drone versus drone, interceptor drones in all through that. But still, if you're talking about the cheap drones as attack weapon, the interceptor drones are maybe three four times as expensive as that drone, so we haven't leveled it out yet. We are getting closer, but we haven't leveled it out fully yet.
Mikkel Svold (21:19): I think if I was the operator of a power plant or an airport or whatever piece of critical infrastructure, I would be wondering what can I do right now or what should I be looking at right now to be more prepared if such incursions should happen at my facility in five months? Where would your focus be, lasse?
Lasse Due Jørgensen (21:46): Well, right now we're talking a lot about flexible systems, something that you can actually scale with an increased threat. We have seen that now in Denmark over the past couple of few weeks that something happened, and then of course we see a heightened focus on it, which means that we are scaling up systems. If you have a backbone of a system that you can actually scale with this incoming threat... Because the nature of a hybrid attack will also be that you don't know exactly what is coming next. That is the whole nature of it, right? So we also need to understand that we cannot have very set systems that can do one thing. We need to be able to scale them as we see an increased threat picture. Karsten also talked about subsea and surface drones that could also be issued the next time, and then we also have to protect ourselves against that.
Karsten Marrup (22:39): [inaudible 00:22:41]
Mikkel Svold (22:41): Karsten, I want to actually ask... Yeah, I want to ask you the same question.
Karsten Marrup (22:45): Okay, good, because I want to answer as well. Well, one thing is to defeat the threat. Basically shooting down the drones as Lasse has talked about, that's one thing. Another thing is to mitigate the effect. If you are responsible for a power plant or anything like that and you ask me what can I do to prepare myself at the current situation? I would turn to something that we call passive air defense, where the active air defense is the part of the air defense that tries to defeat the threat. The passive air defense is basically what we do in order to mitigate the effect of a successful attack. One thing, again, there's a lot of things we can learn from Ukraine. One of the things we can learn is that they are able to fix their transformer stations, their power plants, whatever, once they've been hit.
(23:37): If we turn to Denmark, let's ask the power plants, "Do you have spare parts? Do you know how to fix this if somebody hits it? Is there anything that we could build in a way that it doesn't necessarily break from a 40-kilo Shahed type warhead and things like that? Is there anything we could disperse? Meaning that if something breaks, the thing next to it doesn't break as well because it's placed a bit further away?" All those kind of things that we put on the umbrella of passive air defense is something that not just the military, but the civil society in Denmark as well should be looking into if you ask me.
Mikkel Svold (24:21): I think that's a brilliant point. Yeah.
Lasse Due Jørgensen (24:23): If I may add to my answer before, because if we're talking about this national air defense and... Not air defense. A critical infrastructure protection and what you would do if you were sitting with the responsibility of a certain critical asset here. Well, it's very unlikely that we will see them having effectors to shoot down or mitigate any drones right now, but what we really want to create is also this deterrence. We want to deny whoever wants to send something in their ability to do it covered. We want to be able to create a comprehensive forensic report of any incidents so that we might know where it's coming from and who the adversary is. Because the nature, again, of a hybrid attack is that there should be no smoking gun, there should be nothing pointing directly back to you who has initiated this hybrid attack. If we can start building up that ability within the critical infrastructure... I also think we have come a long way in terms of doing this. Again, we are not in a war scenario here, so it's a completely different kind of mean that we are looking into in terms of protecting the critical infrastructure.
Mikkel Svold (25:33): Let's try and zoom a little bit out now. You mentioned the term hybrid warfare many times, both of you, and I think it's fair for the listeners out there and maybe for myself actually also just to get down. What does that actually mean hybrid warfare, Karsten? You mentioned that it's just below the threshold of what would actually be war. My question is can you give examples of a hybrid warfare incursion or incident and also maybe answer or put some words to what is the purpose of conducting hybrid war?
Karsten Marrup (26:16): Well, I would say that basically creating instability is the purpose. Whatever means you can find to do that doesn't involve kinetic attack, because, again, that would be an armed attack and that would be the first step towards war, you're good to go. It could be everything. We see cyber attacks in Denmark and basically all countries all over the world at the moment on a daily basis against critical infrastructure. That I would label as part of hybrid means. We just talked about how you could fly a small drone into Heathrow Airport and close down the airport. I would label that as hybrid means as well. It could be various kinds of disinformation on X or Bluesky or whatever that would create doubts in the population about whether something is X or Y. There's a lot of possibilities to use hybrid means in order to create instability in another nation.
Mikkel Svold (27:18): And what can you do about it?
Karsten Marrup (27:22): Well, first of all, I think that the more knowledge you have about what this actually means, the better you are defending against it. Having said that, though, an open democratic society with free news or media as we have in Denmark is actually a perfect place to conduct or to use hybrid means. Because, for instance, if you have the open press asking critical questions to politicians because they think something has happened and they believe that the politicians are not doing what they should do or doing some kind of misconduct about an observation, then you'll have this discussion going on. You rattle a society, you might even see politicians start to argue against each other, and actually then you are creating effects by using simple hybrid means.
(28:21): It is actually very difficult to defend against. I would say that the only thing you can actually do is, of course, again, to realize when something is going on. It's very, very important. Again, you can't defend against something if you don't know it's there. Situational awareness about, for instance, the use of bots on the internet, the use of disinformation on the internet. You have to make sure that you can fact check something and, again, keep control of the narrative so it doesn't spin out of control and suddenly something becomes something that it wasn't.
Mikkel Svold (29:03): I want to ask you, because my next interview is actually with some guys in cyber or experts in cyber security for space operations, so satellites basically. Now, we've talked a lot about drones, but drones are, as I understand it, more... Or the drone activity that we see in Denmark and in the rest of Europe, that is a means or a way to conduct hybrid warfare. From a hybrid warfare point of view, what do you think I should ask the cybersecurity for space operations? What should I ask them in the next interview?
Karsten Marrup (29:47): Well, cybersecurity for space operations is critical. There have been numerous cyber attacks on link stations, for instance, in Svalbard in Norway. Of course, space is basically providing the ground for the society that we have today. What we're doing right now, we can only do because of space. Or not necessarily, but space can also help that with satellite communication. Space is the guarantee for all kinds of money transfers in the world with precision, navigation, and timing, or PNT, what people normally refer to as the GPS system. Space is really, really important for all kinds of critical infrastructure and the way that modern society works. Of course cyber then plays a huge role in protecting these space assets, not just the satellites but the link stations against cyber attacks. Because if you are able to disrupt communication, if you're able to close down some of these assets, then we could face a whole lot of problems.
Mikkel Svold (31:01): Do you have something that you think I should ask them that you're wondering?
Karsten Marrup (31:07): Well, actually, I think that it will be interesting to hear how they do that. How do you actually protect your link stations against cyber attacks? If a link station is attacked, what means, what are the procedures, stuff like that, in order to gain control of your link station again? Also historically, what kind of attacks have we incurred? What kind of access did the attacker gain to our satellites? Along that way, if you do that, that will be something I would like to watch and listen to afterwards.
Mikkel Svold (31:42): I'm going to ask them. I'll make sure that I noted it down here. Lasse, I think I want to ask you a last question because our time is nearly up, but coming back to drones... Now we just detoured a little bit to space, but that was just because I have that upcoming interview. Coming back to drones, how do you see the threat landscape evolving over the next, shall we say, 5 or maybe even 10 years, if you dare look that far ahead?
Lasse Due Jørgensen (32:14): No is the short answer to that last question. I'm not sure they're looked that far ahead. If you just look at what have happened over the course of the last five years, I don't think any of us would have guessed where we are right now with this. I think a key to it is the scalability and, on both sides, how is that going to be used right now. That is really what we are looking into and how you can cut that scalability. It's very easy for the adversary to scale. It's not so easy to scale on the defensive side of that, so we need to come to a point where we can actually do that. There we are, of course, looking to new technology in order to mitigate that scalability.
(32:58): And then I think the flexibility is also going to be a part of it. We will likely see drones used in various different ways, new ways also that we haven't seen yet. We talked about subsea surface drones also that is being used, but primarily in a warlike scenario, that could also very well be a part of a hybrid attack at some point. And then I think on top of all of this, we also need to think simplicity into it, because we can very easily create a very large layered defense system. But after all, in the end, you need to somehow be able to get this full comprehensive surveillance picture presented in an easy way so it can actually take a decision based on it because it's very easy adding more systems. Especially on the main side of these systems, it's also going to be a challenge. We need to look at these integrated, simplified systems that can basically take in all of these very diverse data and send it in a simplified way to the operator. I think that's part of it? Yeah.
Mikkel Svold (34:12): Yeah. And Karsten, what about you? What are you anticipating of evolvement?
Karsten Marrup (34:15): I totally agree with Lasse that giving an idea of what's going to happen in five years would be very, very dangerous, especially if you look three and a half years back at the start of the war in Ukraine or the full scale war.
Mikkel Svold (34:31): That's true.
Karsten Marrup (34:31): But one of the things I see at the moment at least is the introduction, and not so much the introduction but the more frequent use of artificial intelligence in drones. With that comes some sort of autonomy as well. That should not only be, I think, or will not only be for the attacking part, it's something we need to look into for the defending part as well, be that in a peacetime scenario or be that in a wartime scenario, because the drones are just getting smarter and we can see that the development in Ukraine... When one side does something, it takes about six to eight weeks before the other side have found a way more or less to work around it or to come up with a similar solution for their part. This is an ongoing arms race at the moment, where the rest of the world more or less can just watch and learn from Ukraine and, sorry to say, but also from Russia because they're also very far ahead of the rest of us. In that perspective, I believe that artificial intelligence and autonomy would play a much larger role than it does at the moment.
Mikkel Svold (35:45): I think let those be the last words. It's very clear to me that there's lots of work that lies ahead for us, for you two, for the whole defense industry, and for anyone working in critical infrastructure and delivering to critical infrastructure. Thank you so much, Karsten Marrup, for participating. And thank you also to you, Lasse Due Jørgensen. It was a pleasure having you on the show.
Lasse Due Jørgensen (36:13): Thank you.
Karsten Marrup (36:15): Good to be here. Thanks.
Mikkel Svold (36:17): And to the listener out there, thank you so much for joining this interview. I hope you got something really interesting out of it. I did for sure. And of course, if you have any questions or anything you'd like to add to the conversation, to ask us or to just let us know, please do reach out to us at podcast@terma.com. And that was podcast@turma.com and we'll be happy to see if we can answer your questions. Of course, also, if you have a future topic that you think we should talk about, let us know on that email. That would be very nice.
(36:51): Also, I want to ask you one little favor. If you like this episode, do share it with your colleagues or friends or whoever you think might find it interesting. That really helps us spread the words and spread the knowledge that we get presented from these brilliant people. Thank you so much for listening and all I have left to say is see you in the next episode.